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1. INTRODUCTION
If you are an attorney, judge, legislator, employer, employee, or concerned
citizen, reflect for a moment on the most egregious employment discrimination case
that comes to mind. Perhaps it is a despicable sexual harassment case in which the
victim suffered immeasurably as a result of the employer's failure to stop the
harassment after the victim informed the employer of the situation.' Maybe it is a
racial harassment case that follows along the same lines.2 Regardless of the fact
pattern most outrageous to you, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, places a cap on the amount of compensatory
damages-emotional pain, suffering, and mental anguish-and punitive damages
recoverable against an employer, under federal law, for any type of employment
discrimination.' At most, the aggrieved employee may recover a total of $300,000
for compensatory and punitive damages.4 Fortunately, Title VII does not preempt
state law regulating employment discrimination. Each individual state can choose
to make discrimination in employment, based on whatever prohibited factors it so
desires, a violation of state law and may provide a greater or lesser remedy for such
a violation than federal law provides.6
The vast majority of states, in fact, have their own antidiscrimination statutes
that, like federal law, prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion,
national origin, and disability. Some state antidiscrimination statutes expand the
categories of protected groups.8 These states vary immensely in terms of the
remedies available forv iolations of their particular state antidiscrimination statutes.
For example, some state antidiscrimination statutes cap the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages recoverable in an employment discrimination
1. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 582-83 (Ariz. 1987) (in banc) (involving a sexual
harassment victim's attempted suicide after her employer repeatedly failed to stop the harassment).
2. See Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving racial
harassment, including racist name-calling, jokes, graffiti, and threats, that persisted over a decade-long
period of time).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
4. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
5. See id. § 2000e-7 ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or
political subdivision of a State .. "); Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 469 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (ruling that Title VII does not preempt a common law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on sexual harassment).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
7. 6 ARTHUR LARSON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 114.01 .02 (2d ed. 2006).
Mississippi and Alabama do not have state antidiscrimination statutes. Georgia does not have a state
antidiscrimination statute applicable to private employers but does have an antidiscrimination statute,
Fair Employment Practices Act of 1978, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-20 to -46 (2002), that applies to
public employers. Id. § 45-19-21(a).
8. For example, the New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-
A: 1-25 (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2006), prohibits discrimination in employment because of marital
status or sexual orientation. Id. § 354-A:7(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
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case along the lines of Title VII.9 Other state statutes do not allow for the recovery
of compensatory or punitive damages at all.'0 Some state statutes permit the
recovery of compensatory damages but disallow the recovery of punitive
damages." Conversely, other state statutes allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover
both compensatory and punitive damages, and place no specific caps on the
recovery of those types of damages.12
As a practical matter, unless an aggrieved employment discrimination plaintiff
is in a state that has an antidiscrimination statute that allows for a full recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages without legislative restriction, it only makes
sense in a case of egregious discrimination for a plaintiff to consider suing the
employer for violating the state's common law. For example, almost all state
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' Egregious employment discrimination in the form of sexual or racial
9. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(B)(8)(e) (2002); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.2585(d)
(Vernon 2006). In Texas, the punitive damages cap in the state antidiscrimination statute may be
superseded in some cases by another lower state statutory cap on punitive damages. See Arismendez
v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 612 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the maximum
amount of punitive damages recoverable in a claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act the Texas antidiscrimination statute was determined not by section 21.2585(d), but by section
41.008 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
10. See Fields v. Cummins Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631, 640 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989) ("Compensatory and punitive damages are not available under the Indiana Civil Rights Act."),
overruled on other grounds by Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 389 n.8 (Ind. 1999); see
also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6(k)(A) (LexisNexis 1997) (limiting relief to only wages, salary, or
commissions); N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-20 (2004) (limiting relief for violation of the Act to equitable
relief and back pay).
11. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.450 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:303(A)
(1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-35.1 (1995).
12. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 3 (West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.99 (LexisNexis
2001); Rice v. CertainTeed Corp., 704 N.E.2d 1217, 1218-20 (Ohio 1999) (interpreting Ohio's
antidiscrimination law as permitting punitive damages).
13. See Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 324 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam) (citing Am.
Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980)): Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart, 990 P.2d 626,
634-35 (Alaska 1999) (citing Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 208-09 (Alaska 1995)): Ford v.
Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987); Templeton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 563,
566 (Ark. 2005) (citing Brown v. Tucker, 954 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Ark. 1997)); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d
373, 382 (Cal. 1990); Archer v. Farmer Bros., 70 P.3d 495, 499 (Colo. C. App. 2002); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985) (citing Thomas v. Ronald A. Edwards Constr. Co.,
293 S.E.2d 383, 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Dunn v. W. Union Tel. Co., 59 S.E. 189, 191 92 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1907)); Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 335 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Hac v. Univ.
of Haw., 73 P.3d 46,60-61 (Haw. 2003); Hatfieldv. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 606 P.2d 944, 950 (Idaho
1980); Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1247 (111. 1996) (McMorrow, J., specially concurring)
(citing Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 163 65 (Ill. 1961)); Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31
(Ind. 1991); Vaughn v. AG Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 635 36 (Iowa 1990) (citing Vinson v.
Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984)); Dawson v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of
Kan., 529 P.2d 104, 109-11 (Kan. 1974); Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Ky. 1984); White
v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 10 (La. 1991); Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 711 A.2d
842, 847 (Me. 1998) (citing Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991)); Harris v.
Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613-14 (Md. 1977); Brown v. Inter-City Fed. Bank for Sav., 738 So. 2d 262,
264-65 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Kiphart v. Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 729 S.W.2d 510, 516 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); Gall v. Great W. Sugar Co., 363 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Neb. 1985); Shoen v. Amerco, Inc.,
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harassment can potentially satisfy the elements of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.'4 If such elements are satisfied, the aggrieved plaintiff
may generally recover the full panoply of compensatory and punitive damages that
are available at common law.15 In addition, some states also recognize common law
"public policy" claims for employment discrimination which provide traditional tort
remedies. 6 Assault, battery, and negligent employment tort claims could also
potentially apply to allegations of supervisory harassment based on race or sex,
claims which also provide traditional tort remedies. 7
These common law torts may be beneficial to aggrieved employment
discrimination plaintiffs for two additional reasons. First, numerous state
antidiscrimination statutes do not cover employers that have a small number of
896 P.2d 469, 476 (Nev. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694 (N.J. 1998) (citing
Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
976 P.2d 999, 1009 (N.M. 1999); S. Furniture Hardware, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 526
S.E.2d 197, 201 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 923 24 (N.D. 1989);
Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 670-71 (Ohio 1983); Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson,
958 P.2d 128, 149 (Okla. 1998); Harris v. Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 529 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841,849 (Or. 1995) (inbanc)); Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476,482
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (citing Hooten v. Pa. Coll. of Optometry, 601 F. Supp. 1151, 1154 (E.D. Pa.
1984)): Curtis v. State Dep't for Children & Their Families, 522 A.2d 203, 208 (R.I. 1987); Bergstrom
v. Palmetto Health Alliance, 358 S.C. 388, 401, 596 S.E.2d 42, 48 (2004) (citing Ford v. Huston, 276
S.C. 157, 162, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 79 (1981)); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)
(citing Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270, 274 75 (Tenn. 1966)); Twyman v. Twyman, 855
S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. 1993); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1961); Crump v. P & C
Food Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441,448 (Vt. 1990); Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1012-13 (Wash.
1989) (en banc); Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Wis. 1963). This is not an exhaustive list of
states that recognize the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
14. See Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding ajury's verdict that
found an employer liable on a sexual harassment plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim); Taylor, 706 A.2d at 698 (discussing the appropriate analysis in New Jersey for examining an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stemming from an allegation of racial harassment).
15. See Coates, 976 P.2d at 1003, 1009-10 (upholding a $45,000 compensatory damages award
for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and $1,755,000 punitive damages award for all
other tort claims based upon sexual harassment).
16. See Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Cal. 1997) ("[B]ecause the FEHA
expressly does not preempt any common law tort claims, the FEHA's age discrimination remedies are
not exclusive and do not bar a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against
age discrimination."); Saint v. Data Exch., Inc., 145 P.3d 1037, 1038 39 (Okla. 2006) (recognizing a
common law wrongful discharge tort based on age discrimination in employment); Collier v. Insignia
Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 325-26 (Okla. 1999) (recognizing a common law wrongful discharge tort
based on sexual harassment in employment); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Okla.
1992) (recognizing a common law wrongful discharge tort based on racial discrimination in
employment).
17. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377-79 (Minn. 1990) (en banc) (holding
that a plaintiff may bring a common law battery claim based on sexual harassment); Schweitzer v.
Rockwell Int'l, 586 A.2d 383, 387 89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that Pennsylvania's
antidiscrimination statute does not bar a common law action for assault based on sexual harassment);
Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 967 (Utah 1992) (allowing
a common law action for negligent employment where plaintiff' s coworkers retaliated against her after
she made complaints of sexual harassment against them).
[Vol. 59:115
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employees. 8 The threshold requirements found in these state statutes roughly
parallel the fifteen-employee threshold for coverage under Title VII,' 9 although
some provide broader coverage than Title VII. z° If an aggrieved employment
discrimination plaintiff works for a smaller company not covered by his state's
antidiscrimination statute, common law torts may be his only viable option to seek
21redress for his injuries. Second, many state antidiscrimination statutes require
exhaustion of administrative remedies-filing a charge of discrimination with the
state equal employment opportunity commission-before bringing a suit alleging
a violation of the statute. 22 The deadlines for filing a discrimination charge are often
compressed, especially in comparison to the statute of limitations applicable to a
common law tort claim. For example, the Texas state antidiscrimination statute sets
a 180-day deadline for filing a discrimination charge with the relevant state
agency. In contrast, a short deadline for filing a common law tort claim is
typically one year, and in many cases, the limitations period extends to at least two
years.24 Given this state of affairs, a common law tort may be the only option for
an aggrieved person who did not file a timely charge under the state
antidiscrimination statute.
As is obvious from the previous discussion, the common law can be a critical
resource for employment discrimination complainants. It is clear that Title VII does
not stand in the way of a complainant utilizing state common law to pursue a
18. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.310(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (fifteen-employee threshold for
coverage); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (four-employee threshold for coverage);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (four-employee threshold for
coverage); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(4) (2005) (eight-employee threshold for coverage); TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.002(8)(A) (Vernon 2006) (fifteen-employee threshold for coverage); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv) (2005) (fifteen-employee threshold for coverage); WASH. REV. CODEANN.
§ 49.60.040(3) (West Supp. 2007) (eight-employee threshold for coverage); W. VA. CODEANN. § 5-11 -
3(d) (LexisNexis 2006) (twelve-employee threshold for coverage).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
20. See sources cited supra note 18.
21. See Weaver v. Harpster, 885 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Super. C. 2005) (recognizing a common
law wrongful discharge claim for sexual harassment as a public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine where the employer was not covered by the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act
because it had less than four employees).
22. See, e.g., Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required only for claims filed pursuant to the Colorado
Antidiscrimination Act).
23. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.0015, 21.202(a) (Vernon 2006).
24. "Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress [under Louisiana law] are.., governed
by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions ...."King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 743 So.
2d 181, 187 (La. 1999) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (Supp. 2007)). Under Texas law, the
applicable limitations period for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and
battery is two years. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006);
Brandon v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 04-05-00379-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7630, at *4 (citing TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006)) (recognizing that the limitations
period applicable to battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims is two
years); Bhalli v. Methodist Hosp., 896 S.W.2d 207,211 (Tex. App. 1995) ("[T]he applicable limitations
period for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years from the accrual of the
cause of action.").
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recovery against the complainant's employer.2 5 Whether state statutory law stands
in the way of the common law is an entirely different story-this issue is typically
anything but clear. State courts in multiple jurisdictions have struggled with two
crucial preemption issues for the last twenty-five plus years. First, whether the
state's workers' compensation statute preempts common law tort claims based on
unlawful discriminatory harassment.26  Second, whether the state's
antidiscrimination statute preempts common law tort claims based on unlawful
discriminatory harassment.27
This Article addresses the second of these two questions.28 Some states have
already had their highest state court rule on the state antidiscrimination statute
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Compare Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 939 (Del. 1996) (finding that
the Delaware Workers' Compensation Act bars employees from asserting common law tort claims
against their employers for claims of sexual harassment arising out of their employment), with Byrd v.
Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989) (finding that the exclusivity rule
of Florida's workers' compensation statute does not bar the common law tort claims of assault,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or battery arising from sexual harassment).
27. Compare Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36,38 (Iowa 1993) (finding that the Iowa
Civil Rights Act is the exclusive state remedy for employment discrimination and preempts a common
law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress premised upon sexual harassment), with
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1215-16 (Ohio 1989) (holding that
Ohio's antidiscrimination statute does not preempt common law tort claims arising out of workplace
sexual harassment).
28. The first question is certainly important. It seems the correct view is that workers'
compensation statutes do not bar common law tort claims based on discriminatory harassment. The
rationale for this position varies among jurisdictions. Some courts hold that common law actions are
not barred when the injury entails only emotional distress because mental injuries are noncompensable
under the applicable workers' compensation. See, e.g., Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322,
325 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam). Other courts hold that discriminatory harassment is not an "accidental
injury" or a risk inherently connected to the workplace and thus find no preemption. See Burns v.
Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 68 (D. Nev. 2001); Horodyskj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470,478 (Colo.
2001) (en banc); Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528, 531 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Furukawa
v. Honolulu Zoological Soc'y, 936 P.2d 643, 654 (Haw. 1997); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976
P.2d 999, 1004-05 (N.M. 1999). The most persuasive reason is simply that the public policy against
discriminatory harassment is undermined where a court applies the exclusivity rule of workers'
compensation to preclude all tort liability. See Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d
1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989) ("The clear public policy emanating from federal and Florida law holds that an
employer is charged with maintaining a workplace free from sexual harassment. Applying the
exclusivity rule of workers' compensation to preclude any and all tort liability effectively would
abrogate this policy, undermine the Florida Human Rights Act, and flout Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. This we cannot condone."). Nonetheless, a number of courts hold that workers'
compensation statutes do bar common law tort claims based on discriminatory harassment because such
injuries are connected to the workplace. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 137 38 (2d
Cir. 2001) (applying New York law); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936, 939 40 (Del.
1996); Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 542 A.2d 363, 365-67 (Me. 1988). This Article does not
analyze the workers' compensation angle in detail, but it presupposes that workers' compensation
statutes should, in general, not bar common law tort claims based on discriminatory harassment. For
a more extensive explanation and discussion of the workers' compensation preemption issue, see 6
ARTHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 103 05 (2007). To
some degree, the antidiscrimination statute preemption issue is less relevant in a state in which workers'
compensation bars common law tort claims based on discriminatory harassment.
[Vol. 59:115
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preemption issue, but several states have not directly addressed the issue.29 A
scholarly inquiry into the issue may be of some aid when the issue does arise in the
highest appellate courts of those undecided states. Moreover, hopefully this inquiry
will assist in the resolution of potential conflicts between future state statutory
enactments and state common law in the employment arena.
Assuming as a bedrock principle-as it must-this Article proposes that a state
legislature has the power to preempt common law tort claims based on unlawful
discrimination, if it so desires, and may exercise that power through explicit
preemption language. 0 However, when the legislature is not explicit as is usually
the case-it becomes necessary to devise principles for determining whether the
mere presence of a state antidiscrimination statute and the concomitant
administrative regime impliedly preempts a variety of common law tort claims
based on employment discrimination or discriminatory harassment. This Article
attempts to do just that. It focuses on preemption of such common law claims in the
context of a lawsuit between an aggrieved plaintiff and the plaintiff s employer or
former employer, not on suits between individuals. 3
The legal analysis this Article proposes for determining whether a state
antidiscrimination statute preempts common law tort claims based on employment
29. States that have addressed the issue in their Supreme Court in some form or fashion include
Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Cronin v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d
231, 235 39 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 376 83 (Cal. 1990) (in bank);
Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68-70 (Colo. 1995) (en banc): Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chi.,
Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1275-78 (I1. 1994); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36,38-39 (Iowa
1993); Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377 79 (Minn. 1990) (en banc); Harrison v.
Chance, 797 P.2d 200, 202 05 (Mont. 1990); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 924 28 (N.J. 2004);
Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 701 (N.J. 1998); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543
N.E.2d 1212, 1215-16 (Ohio 1989); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225-31 (Okla.
1992); Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int'l, 586 A.2d 383, 387 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Hoffiann-La Roche
Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 446 50 (Tex. 2004); Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989, 991 97
(Utah 2002); Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns ofthe Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 961-62 (Utah
1992); Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901,904-07 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); Hoflund v. Airport Golf Club,
105 P.3d 1079, 1086 (Wyo. 2005). This is a non-exhaustive list.
30. See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 24 (111. 1997) ("Common law rights and remedies
are in full force in [Illinois] unless repealed by the legislature or modified by the decision of our courts.
A legislative intent to abrogate the common law must be clearly andplainly expressed, and such an
intent will not be presumed from ambiguous or doubtful language." (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
31. In Texas, the state antidiscrimination statute preempts intentional infliction of emotional
distress causes of action arising out of discriminatory harassment claims filed against employers. See
Hoffmanm-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 446 50 (Tex. 2004). The Texas courts
disagree on whether this rule extends to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against
individual supervisors where the gravamen of the complaint involves discriminatory workplace
harassment. Compare Swafford v. Bank of Am. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763-65 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(disallowing a plaintiff to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against an
individual supervisor to circumvent legislative prohibitions), with Dixon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Cos., 433 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788-90 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (disagreeing with the Swaffordcourt and finding
that nothing in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act prevents a plaintiff from asserting a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against an individual supervisor).
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discrimination or discriminatory harassment should depend on the type of common
law tort in question. It identifies separate categories of common law torts, each of
which is given different treatment. Torts that have an existence separate and apart
from employment discrimination are not impliedly preempted by the mere presence
of a state antidiscrimination statute. Torts that do not have an existence separate and
apart from employment discrimination are impliedly preempted if they were not
recognized under a state's common law prior to the enactment of the state
antidiscrimination statute. Common law wrongful discharge torts that existed prior
to the enactment of a state antidiscrimination statute are not impliedly preempted.
Part II of this Article categorizes and describes the different types of common
law discrimination torts. Part III examines the conditions under which a particular
type of common law discrimination tort should be impliedly preempted by a state
antidiscrimination statute and explains why the law should distinguish between the
various torts. Part IV applies the principles established in Part III to specific
jurisdictions that have an antidiscrimination statute and also recognize certain
common law discrimination torts. Part IV concludes with a reminder that the
resolution of the preemption issue reflects the standing of the common law in our
judicial and governmental systems. Part V completes the Article by summarizing
the proposed outcome of the implied preemption question as to two specific
common law torts.
II. CATEGORIES OF COMMON LAW "DISCRIMINATION" TORTS
A. Torts that Exist Separate and Apart from Employment Discrimination
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress,32 also known as the tort of outrage.3 Originally
recognized by the Restatement of Torts in 1934,34 almost all jurisdictions have now
adopted intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort.3 5 Courts
require four elements in an outrage claim: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or
recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the
defendant's action caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
33. See State ex rel Davidson v. Hoke, 532 S.E.2d 50, 56-57 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher, J.,
concurring).
34. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
35. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 22 (Tex. 1993) ("Today we become the forty-
seventh state to adopt the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as set out in [section] 46(1 )
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS."): see also sources cited supra note 13 (listing various states
which recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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emotional distress was severe.36 The Restatement (Second) of Torts places strict
limits on the tort by appropriately setting high standards for outrageous conduct and
severe emotional distress. 7 In determining the severity of the distress, physical
injury is not required, but evidence of physical harm is a factor. 8 The tort is
applicable to employment disputes but is not necessarily aimed at employment
disputes.39 Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims have arisen in a variety
of contexts, including domestic and commercial life.4" Indeed, none of the
illustrations in the Restatement (Second) of Torts concerning liability for the tort of
outrage directly involve employment-related fact patterns.4'
2. Assault and Battery
Assault and battery are longstanding intentional torts recognized at common
law.42 A battery takes place when "the defendant's acts intentionally cause harmful
or offensive contact with the victim's person., 43 Assault occurs when "the
defendant's acts intentionally cause the victim's reasonable apprehension of
36. See Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 606 P.2d 944, 953 (Idaho 1980); Vaughn v. AG
Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 635 36 (Iowa 1990) (citing Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984)): Dawson v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Kan., 529 P.2d 104, 111
(Kan. 1974); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398
S.W.2d 270,274 75 (Tenn. 1966), overruled inpart on other grounds by Camper v. Minor, 915 SAW.2d
437, 444 46 (Tenn. 1996) (overruling requirement that some kind of physical manifestation must exist
for a plaintiffto recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress)): Standard Fruit & Veg. Co. v.
Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998) (citing Twynan, 855 S.W.2d at 621).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) ("Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.... The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppressions, or other trivialities."); see also id. § 46 cmt. j ("[EmoFtional distress] includes all
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment,
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability
arises.... The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could
be expected to endure it.").
38. See Hatfield, 606 P.2d at 953 54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965).
39. See Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The
Case against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 392-411 (1994)
(discussing the development of the tort ofintentional infliction of emotional distress and its application
to the field of employment law).
40. See, e.g., Dawson, 529 P.2d at 111 ("A creditor who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to the debtor is subject to liability for such
emotional distress and, if bodily harm to the debtor results from it, for such bodily harm."); Twyman,
855 S.W.2d at 620 (allowing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a divorce
proceeding).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 illus. 1-22 (1965).
42. See I de S et Ux v. W de S, Y.B. Lib. Ass. fol. 99, pl. 60 (Assizes 1348), reprinted in VICTOR
E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 37 (1 th ed. 2005); Cole v. Turner, 90
Eng. Rep. 958 (Nisi Prius 1704); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES * 119 20.
43. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 6 (1996); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004).
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immediate harmful or offensive contact."44 Assault and battery existed long before
state and federal legislatures became interested in sexual harassment and redressing
violations of bodily integrity and personal liberty.4 s Nonetheless, a sexually
motivated assault or battery in violation of the common law could also satisfy the
elements of a state statutory claim for sexual harassment.46
3. Negligent Employment, Negligent Retention, Negligent Hiring
Under general principles of tort law, an employer may be directly liable for its
own negligence in hiring, supervising, and retaining employees.4 The general
negligent hiring rule aims to protect fellow employees and the public from workers
who are unsafe or dangerous on the job.4" In some jurisdictions, a negligent hiring
and retention claim can be based on an employee's intentional tort committed
outside the scope of employment.4 9 It is not unusual for a third party customer or
invitee, or a fellow employee to sue an employer for negligent hiring or retention
based on an employee's intentional tort that occurred outside the scope of
employment. 50 The tort is broad enough to cover all sorts of wrongdoing committed
by employees while on the job."' It may include, but is not limited to, claims of
discriminatory harassment committed by a supervisor against a subordinate
employee.
52
44. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 43, at 9; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (8th ed. 2004).
45. See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 24 (111. 1997).
46. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Minn. 1990) (en banc); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03, subdiv. 43 (West Supp. 2007) ("' Sexual harassment' includes unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or
physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when: (1) submission to that conduct or
communication is made a term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining employment
.... (2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor
in decisions affecting that individual's employment .... or (3) that conduct or communication has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment . . . or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment... environment.").
47. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 501-02 (5th ed. 1984); see
also, e.g., J.H. v. W. Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 124 (Utah 1992) (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort,
808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991)) ("[A]n employer may be directly liable for its acts or omissions in
hiring or supervising its employees.").
48. See Wise v. Complete Staffing Servs., Inc., 56 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. App. 2001) (citing
Estate ofArrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. App. 1979)).
49. See TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 590 S.E.2d 807, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (citing
Henderson v. Noting First Mortgage Corp., 193 S.E. 347, 353-54 (Ga. 1937)).
50. See TGMAshley Lakes, 590 S.E.2d at 811 12. But see Urdiales v. Concord Techs. Del., Inc.,
120 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Walls Reg'l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806 08
(Tex. 1999) (per curiam)) (holding that the workers' compensation act barred an employee's negligent
hiring claim based on a supervisor's battery).
51. See, e.g., RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 105-08 (2005) (providing various situations
in which employers may be liable for negligent employment).
52. See, e.g., Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 974
(Utah 1992) (holding that an employee's negligent employment claim based on sexual harassment by
supervisors and coemployees was not preempted).
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4. Employer Liability
Discriminatory harassment, whether it takes the form of sexual harassment,
racial harassment, or disability harassment, can, in certain situations, satisfy the
elements of the common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
battery, assault, negligent retention, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision. 3
With respect to the negligence causes of action, the employer is directly liable for
its own acts or omissions in hiring, supervising, and retaining employees that
proximately cause injury to the harassed victim.5 4 With respect to the intentional
tort causes of action, the employer's possible liability for the intentional acts of
company personnel is predicated on various theories, depending on thejurisdiction.
a. Vicarious Liability
An employer is generally not liable for an employee's intentional torts
committed outside the scope of employment.5 Intentional torts arising from a
supervisor's discriminatory harassment of his employee are typically not considered
to be actions within the scope of employment.56 Vicarious liability under the
common law in workplace harassment scenarios may nevertheless still attach in
several jurisdictions. Under New Mexico law, for example, an employer may be
vicariously liable for the intentional torts of assault, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress committed by a supervisor, arising out of sexual
harassment, if the supervisor was "aided by his status as [the plaintiff s] supervisor
in committing his alleged torts. ' 57 In other words, the discriminatory harassment
victim may prevail against the employer based on these intentional torts by
presenting sufficient evidence that the harasser's supervisory authority aided in the
commission of the torts.58 Washington law allows employer liability for intentional
torts based on harassment because harassment may take place within the scope of
employment. In a unique case, a deli worker tormented by fellow employees,
allegedly because of her disability, won a judgment against her employer on her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 59 The Washington Supreme Court
53. See discussion supra Part II.A.I 3.
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. See Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58, 70 71 (N.M. 2004) ("[A]n employer is not
generally liable for an employee's intentional torts because an employee who intentionally injures
another individual is generally considered to be acting outside the scope of his or her employment.").
56. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998) ("The general rule is that
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.").
57. Ocana, 91 P.3d at 71 (adopting the aided-in-agency theory of vicarious liability in the context
of employee's intentional tort claims against employer based on the supervisor's sexual harassment).
58. Id. The aided-in-agency theory provides that an employer may be held liable for the
intentional torts of an employee acting outside the scope of employment if the employee "was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(2)(d) (1958). The rationale for the theory is that the employee "may be able to cause harm
because of his position as agent" of the employer. Id. § 219 cmt. e.
59. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 621 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
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ruled that the employer was vicariously liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because its employees "tormented [the worker] on company property
during working hours, as they interacted with co-workers and customers and
performed the duties they were hired to perform."6 Therefore, the harassment
occurred within the scope of the deli workers' employment.6'
b. Direct Liability
An employee victim of discriminatory harassment may also proceed directly
against the employer for the intentional torts of a company agent when the agent
is the alter ego of the company.62 Under South Carolina law, for example, an
employee's action against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, assault, and battery will lie when the tortfeasor is the employer's alter
ego.6" However, only dominant corporate owners and officers may constitute alter
egos.64 A slightly different theory also exists for subjecting employers to direct
liability for an agent's intentional torts. Under Tennessee law, for example, direct
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress attaches when the employer




62. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (stating that section 219(2)(a) of
the Restatement (Second) ofAgency addresses liability "where the agent's high rank in the company
makes him orherthe employer's alter ego"); see also Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 383
(5th Cir. 2003) (ruling that one situation in which an employer is vicariously liable for its employees'
activities is when the harasser is a proxy for the employer (agreeing with Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d
725, 730 (7th Cir. 2000))).
63. See Dickertv. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 311 S.C. 218, 220, 428 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1993); McSwain
v. Shei, 304 S.C. 25, 29-30, 402 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. S.C.
State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 422 & n.2, 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 & n.2 (2002) (discussing subject matter
jurisdiction in negligent employment cases); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55 56, 9
S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940).
64. Dickert, 311 S.C. at 221, 428 S.E.2d at 701 (citing 2A ARTHUR LARSON & LEX LARSON,
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 68.21-.22 (2007)).
65. See Pollard v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 665 (6thCir. 2005) ("[A] corporate
body may be liable for the infliction of emotional distress if its corporate supervisors and officials
engage in conduct that rises to the level of reckless disregard of outrageous conduct .... [Corporate]
liability is based not on vicarious liability. Rather, it is based on the entity's failure to act in the face of
outrageous conduct by persons under its immediate control who are causing serious harm within the
general scope of employment and within the knowledge of its officials.").
66. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 121 (N.C. C. App. 1986) ("As a
general rule, liability of a principal for the torts ofhis agent may arise.., when the agent's act is ratified
by the principal.") (citing Snow v. De Butts, 193 S.E. 224, 226 (N.C. 1937)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 93, 94 (1958); see also Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 378 S.E.2d 232, 236 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (upholding a jury finding that an employer's failure to rectify the problem posed by an
employee's sexual harassment showed ratification of the conduct).
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B. Torts that Do Not Exist Separate and Apart from Employment
Discrimination
Some states that have antidiscrimination statutes recognize common law
wrongful discharge actions for some forms of employment discrimination.67 Many
states do not recognize such actions.68 When allowed, these wrongful discharge
actions are exceptions to the at-will rule and mimic the state statutory action.69
These torts are dependent upon a "public policy" outlawing a particular type of
discrimination; however, the "public policy" against that discrimination is already
specifically expressed and remedied by statute. y Unlike claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and negligent employment,
common law wrongful discharge claims for employment discrimination generally
serve no purpose other than to provide an overlapping remedy for behavior that
already violates a state statute or to provide a civil action where the legislature
intended none to exist.
7'
67. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-3(10) (LexisNexis 2004) (permitting a civil action for
sexual harassment irrespective ofthe statutory rights provided under the antidiscrimination law); Cronin
v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 241 (Ariz. 1999) (en bamc) (allowing a wrongful discharge action for
employment discrimination but limiting available remedies to those provided under Arizona's
antidiscrimination statute); Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Cal. 1997) (holding that
California's statutory age discrimination remedies are not exclusive and do not bar a tort claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999,
1004 06 (N.M. 1999) (ruling that the exclusivity provision ofthe New Mexico Workers' Compensation
Act does not bar an employee's common law sexual harassment tort claim); Saint v. Data Exch., Inc.,
145 P.3d 1037, 1038-39 (Okla. 2006) (recognizing a common law wrongful discharge tort based on age
discrimination in employment); Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 P.2d 321, 326 (Okla. 1999)
(recognizing a common law wrongful discharge tort based on sexual harassment in employment); Tate
v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230-31 (Okla. 1992) (recognizing a common law wrongful
discharge tort based on racial discrimination in employment); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d
1292, 1300 03 (Or. 1984) (in banc) (recognizing a commonlaw wrongful discharge action forresisting
workplace sexual harassment); Weaver v. Harpster, 885 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(recognizing a common law wrongful discharge claim for sexual harassment against a small employer
not covered by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 908-11
(Wash. 2000) (en banc) (recognizing a common law wrongful discharge claim for gender discrimination
against a small employer not covered by the Washington Law Against Discrimination).
68. See Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 777-78 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Michigan law);
Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 568 (D.N.J. 2000) (applying New Jersey law);
Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 501 A.2d 1223, 1226 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985); Makovi v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 540 A.2d 494,497 98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Harrison v. Chance, 797 P.2d 200,203
(Mont. 1990); Lewis v. Fairview Hosp., 806 N.E.2d 185, 188-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Gottlingv. P.R.
Inc., 61 P.3d 989, 992 (Utah 2002).
69. See Weaver, 885 A.2d at 1076 78.
70. See Mfakovi, 540 A.2d at 498 (finding that a common law wrongful discharge claim based on
gender discrimination is preempted when a state statute provides a remedy for such conduct).
71. See Gottling, 61 P.3d at 997-98 (refusing to craft a common law remedy where the legislature
intended no remedy to exist).
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111. DISTINGUISHING CATEGORIES OF COMMON LAW "DISCRIMINATION" TORTS FOR
PREEMPTION PURPOSES
A state legislature retains control over the preemptive effect, if any, that its
antidiscrimination statute has on state tort law.72 Subject to constitutional
constraints, state legislatures have plenary authority to explicitly preempt common
law tort claims for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
assault, battery, and negligent employment that relate to claims of employment
discrimination." When a legislature makes its intentions on preemption explicitly
clear, whether the legislature adopts preemption or rejects preemption, the courts
must adhere to the expressed intent.74 Montana law is an excellent example of a
state antidiscrimination statute that has explicit preemption language faithfully
enforced by the Montana courts. 7 The development of Montana law in this area is
instructive and models the appropriate interaction between court and legislature.76
The Montana Human Rights Act bars discrimination in employment based on
race, creed, religion, color, national origin, age, disability, marital status, or sex.
77
72. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
73. See Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he creation of
a private right of action by state statute does not bar pre-existing common law rights of action unless
the legislature clearly expressed its intent to do so."); Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d
1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) ("[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed, so that if the legislature wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under
the common law, it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication."); Shetsky v.
Hennepin County, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1953) (explaining that since the presumption is that
statutory law is consistent with common law, abrogation of the common law by statutory enactment
must be "by express wording or necessary implication") (citations omitted); Helmick v. Cincinnati
Word Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ohio 1989) ("[A]n existing common-law remedy may
not be extinguished by a statute except by direct enactment or necessary implication."); Silver v.
Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 884 (Okla. 1988) ("The common law supplements our statutes. It remains in full
force unless it is clearly and expressly modified or abrogated by our constitution or by statute."); E.B.
& A.C. Whiting Co. v. City of Burlington, 175 A. 35, 44 (Vt. 1934) ("[R]ules of the common law are
not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous
language.").
74. See Gottling, 61 P.3d at 997 98.
75. See Act of March 22, 2007, ch. 28, § 8, 2007 Mont. Laws, (to be codified at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-508(1)), available at 2007 ALS 28 *9 ("The provisions of this chapter [of the Montana
Human Rights Act] establish the exclusive remedy for acts constituting an alleged violation of... this
chapter, including acts that may otherwise also constitute a violation of the discrimination provisions
of Article 11, section 4, of the Montana constitution or 49-1-102. A claim or request for relief based
upon the acts may not be entertained by a district court other than by the procedures specified in this
chapter.").
76. Arizona law developed in a fashion similar to Montana law. See infra notes 79 85 and
accompanying text. The Arizona Supreme Court initially issued a decision finding no preemption, and
the Arizona Legislature subsequently enacted legislation that expressly limits available remedies for
wrongful discharge claims based on violations of the state's antidiscrimination statute. See Cronin v.
Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 236 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (recognizing that the Arizona Employment
Protection Act permits a wrongful termination action for employment discrimination, but that it also
limits the available remedies to those provided by the Arizona Civil Rights Act).
77. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(1)(a) (2005).
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In Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Co.,78 the Montana Supreme Court permitted a
workplace sexual harassment victim to pursue several sexual harassment based tort
claims under Montana common law even though the state's antidiscrimination
statute made such harassment unlawful and provided a remedy. 79 The Drinkwalter
court held that, because the legislature had not expressed a clear intent to abolish
other common law remedies, the antidiscrimination statute did not provide the
exclusive remedy for sexual harassment.8" The court based its decision on the fact
that the antidiscrimination statute, as it existed at the time of the case, had no
preemption language.8' The Montana Supreme Court correctly decided the
Drinkwalter case based on the lack of explicit preemption language in the
antidiscrimination statute.
In response to Drinkwalter, the Montana legislature enacted an exclusive
remedy provision into its state antidiscrimination statute." The legislative history
of the exclusive remedy provision, the passage of the provision so near in time to
the Drinkwalter decision, and its plain language made clear that the Montana
legislature intended for the state antidiscrimination statute to preempt common law
tort claims based on employment discrimination.83 Consequently, in a post-
exclusive remedy enactment case, Harrison v. Chance,84 the Montana Supreme
Court interpreted the exclusive remedy provision to preempt an employee's
common law claims against her employer for battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, wrongful discharge, and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.85 The Montana Supreme Court correctly decided the Harrison
case based on the presence of explicit preemption language in the statute.
Montana is the exception, rather than the rule, in terms of a clear expression of
legislative intent to preempt common law claims related to employment
discrimination.86 Many state antidiscrimination statutes have either no preemption
78. 732 P.2d 1335 (Mont. 1987), superseded by statute, Act of Apr. 16, 1987, ch. 511, 1987 Mont.
Laws 1240, as recognized in Romero v. J & J Tire, JMH, Inc., 777 P.2d 292, 294 95 (Mont. 1989).
79. Drinkwalter, 732 P.2d at 1338-39.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Act of Apr. 16, 1987, ch. 511, § 1(7), 1987 Mont. Laws 1240, 1242.
83. See Harrison v. Chance, 797 P.2d 200, 203 (Mont. 1990).
84. Id. at 200.
85. Id. at 205 ("[A]ny claim based on sexual harassment can be framed in terms of numerous tort
theories. The legislature expressed its intent that the Commission provide the exclusive remedy for
illegal discrimination when it enacted subsection (7) of § 49-2-509, MCA. To allow such
recharacterization of what is at heart a sexual discrimination claim, would be to eviscerate the mandate
of the Human Rights Commission.").
86. Utah is another exception to the general rule. The plain language of the Utah Anti-
discrimination Act demonstrates an explicit intent to preempt all common law remedies for wrongful
discharge based upon employment discrimination. See UTAH CODEANN. § 34A-5-107(15) (2005) ("The
procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon: (a) race; (b) color; (c) sex; (d) retaliation; (e) pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions; (f) age: (g) religion; (h) national origin: or (i) disability."); Gottling v.
P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989, 992-93 (Utah 2002) (citing Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain
States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 961 (Utah 1992)).
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language at all, or, if preemption language exists, the language is ambiguous.87 In
this context, guidelines for determining whether a state antidiscrimination statute
preempts a particular common law action are necessary. Distinguishing between
types of common law discrimination torts is particularly useful.
87. Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas are examples of states
which have no preemption language. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.310 .435 (LexisNexis 2006);
New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006);
North Dakota Human Rights Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -23 (2004 & Supp. 2007); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1301-1901 (West 1987 & Supp. 2007); Tennessee Human Rights Act, TENN.
CODEANN. §§ 4-21-101 to -1004 (2005 & Supp. 2006); Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001 .556 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2006). California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Washington, and West Virginia are examples of states that have
preemption language in their antidiscrimination statutes that should be construed as demonstrating the
intent not to preempt certain common law claims related to discrimination; one could argue, however,
that the language maintains some ambiguity in terms of antipreemptive scope. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12993(a) (West 2005) ("The provisions ofthis part shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the purposes of this part. Nothing contained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the
provisions of the Civil Rights Law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because
of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation .... "); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.04 (West
2004) ("The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the
purposes thereof Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of
the civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, creed,
color, religion, sex, age, disability, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, national origin,
sexual orientation, or familial status .... ); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1124 (2004) ("Nothing contained in
the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act shall be deemed to repeal any ofthe provisions ofthe civil
rights law, any other law of this state, or any municipal ordinance relating to discrimination because of
race, creed, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:25
(LexisNexis 1995) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions
of the civil rights law or any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of age, sex, race,
creed, color, marital status, physical or mental disability or national origin .... ); N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 300 (McKinney 2005) ("Nothing contained in this article shall be deemed to repeal any of the
provisions of the civil rights law or any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race,
creed, color or national origin .... "); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (LexisNexis 2001) ("Nothing
contained in this chapter shall be considered to repeal any of the provisions of any law of this state
relating to discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability, national origin,
age, or ancestry .... "); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020 (Supp. 2007) ("Nothing contained in this
chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of any other law of this state relating to
discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, age,
or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, other than a law which purports to require
or permit doing any act which is an unfair practice under this chapter."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-
13(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("[N]othing contained inthis article shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any
of the provisions of any existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, municipal charter or of any
law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex,
age, blindness or disability .... ").
In Rojo v. Khger, 801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990) (in bank), the California Supreme Court determined that
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) expressly proclaimed an intent not to preempt common law remedies for
injuries relating to employment discrimination. Id. at 378. The court noted that the "laws" of California
encompass both statutory and common law. Id. at 377. That is a sensible interpretation.
[Vol. 59:115
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A. No Implied Preemption of "Separate and Apart" Torts
No universally applied test exists for determining whether the presence of a
state antidiscrimination statute implicitly preempts common law torts based on the
same facts. The fundamental starting point of any analysis is the oft-stated principle
that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, 8 but this
is only a starting point. Several possible analytical methods exist for determining
whether a state antidiscrimination statute preempts a common law tort. They
include a timing test, a field preemption test, a same conduct test, and an
independence test. 9 The timing approach, sometimes referred to as the antecedent
test, looks to whether the common law tort existed before or after the enactment of
the state antidiscrimination statute. 9 If the common law tort existed prior to the
statute's enactment, it is not preempted.' If the common law tort did not exist
before the statutory enactment, the tort is preempted.92 The application of this test
produces mixed results in the context of assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent employment claims. Because assault and battery
are longstanding common law torts, a state antidiscrimination statute would never
impliedly preempt those claims. 9 The same is not necessarily true for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment claims. In some states,
recognition of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim may not have
come until after the enactment of the state antidiscrimination statute. Thus, this
approach could lead to the implied preemption of outrage claims in certain
jurisdictions.94
The field preemption test presumes that a legislature can supplant the common
law by implication when the statute is so comprehensive that it can be inferred that
88. See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
("[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, so that if the legislature wishes
to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest its intent
either expressly or by clear implication.").
89. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949,962-67 (Utah
1992) (discussing the various available tests).
90. Id. at 964.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 963 ("[Courts which apply the antecedent test] hold that the statutory action is the
exclusive remedy if the common law cause of action did not exist before the statutory cause of action
was created."); see also Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he
creation of a private right of action by state statute does not bar pre-existing common law rights of
action unless the legislature clearly expressed its intent to do so.").
93. Assault and battery have their roots in English common law. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text. State antidiscrimination statutes in this country did not arrive until the latter part
of the twentieth century. The South Dakota legislature, for example, passed the South Dakota Human
Relations Act in 1972. South Dakota Human Relations Act, ch. 11, 1972 S.D. Sess. Laws 46-55.
94. The North Dakota legislature passed the North Dakota Human Rights Act in 1983. North
Dakota's Human Rights Act, ch. 173, 1983 N.D. Laws 466. Although intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims were brought in North Dakota prior to 1983, see Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423,425
(N. D. 1975), it does not appear that the tort was thoroughly discussed and adopted by the North Dakota
Supreme Court until 1989. See Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 923 25 (N.D. 1989).
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the legislature intended to cover the entire subject and thus leave no room for the
common law. 95 In judging whether a state antidiscrimination statute is
comprehensive enough to invoke field preemption, it is common to consider the
statutory coverage and the scope of the remedies.96 For example, several courts
have held that a state antidiscrimination statute is insufficiently comprehensive to
impliedly preempt the common law when the statute did not apply to small
employers, or the statutory remedial scheme did not authorize the recovery of
compensatory or punitive damages. 97
The same conduct test looks at the state antidiscrimination statute to see
whether the common law action is based on the very same conduct that is necessary
to prove unlawful discrimination under the statute. 98 If the required conduct is the
same, the common law is impliedly preempted. 99 The best example of the
application of this test involves jurisdictions that view state antidiscrimination
statutes as impliedly preempting common law intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims on the ground that such claims are merely gap-filler torts.00 The
typical fact pattern involves a plaintiff who has been sexually harassed by her
supervisor.'°1 The harassment that gives rise to the intentional infliction of
95. See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (U.S. 1996) ("A ...
statute, for example, may create a scheme of... regulation 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that [the legislature] left no room for the [common law] to supplement it."') (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 381 (Cal. 1990) (in
bank) ("The general rule is that statutes do not supplant the common law uinless it appears that the
Legislature intended to cover the entire subject.") (citing I.E. Assocs. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 702 P.2d
596,598 (Cal. 1985)): Gilgerv. Hemandez, 997 P.2d 305,308-09 (Utah 2000) (adopting language from
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31); see also William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort
Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 657-59 (2006) (explaining the
dangers in recognizing a judicially created tort remedy if a comprehensive statutory remedy exists).
96. See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 381; Brooke, 906 P.2d at 69: Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing,
Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ohio 1989); Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int'l, 586 A.2d 383, 387-89 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
97. See cases cited supra note 96.
98. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah
1992) (citation omitted).
99. Id.
100. See Messick v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (citing
Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 298-99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)) (stating that the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act impliedly preempts intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based
on sexual harassment because the tort of outrage is not intended to swallow up existing statutory
recovery); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (finding that Iowa's
antidiscrimination statute preempts intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based on sexual
harassment because the plaintiff could not establish the claim without first proving discrimination in
violation of the statute); Hoffmiann-La Roche Inc.v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004)
(citing Standard Fruit & Veg. Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998)) (explaining that the
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act impliedly preempts intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims based on sexual harassment because outrage is "first and foremost, a 'gap-filler' tort, judicially
created for the limited purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances in which a defendant
intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other
recognized theory of redress").
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emotional distress claim also violates the applicable state antidiscrimination
statute. 10 2 The state antidiscrimination statute makes the employer liable for the
conduct and provides a remedy, but the remedy includes a statutory cap on mental
anguish and punitive damages." 3 The court reasons that the purpose of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is to provide a cause of action for
egregious conduct that might otherwise go without a remedy; therefore, the tort
should not be extended to circumvent a legislative limitation on claims for mental
anguish and punitive damages. 10 4 When the statutory remedy is designed to cover
the facts of the case, a plaintiff may not pursue an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.1
0 5
The independence test-or indispensable element test-is a more nuanced test
that considers whether the nature of the injuries alleged by the common law tort
claim are distinct from the inj uries that are the target of the state antidiscrimination
statute. 0 6 Courts compare the interests protected by the antidiscrimination statute
and those protected by the common law claim to check for variations. 1 7 Under this
approach, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not impliedly
preempted by a state antidiscrimination statute when the interests sought to be
protected by the statutory claim are not the same as those sought to be protected by
the tort.'0 8 For example, Ohio and Pennsylvania courts have determined that
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and statutory discrimination
claims are independent enough to thwart implied preemption.'0 9 This results from
the fact that the Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute targets the state's interest
in eradicating specific forms of discrimination, whereas the intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort "vindicates the personal interest of freedom from
intentionally imposed mental anguish.""' 0
With respect to the common law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligent employment, the proper analytical approach for
102. See id. at 446 48.
103. See id. at 446.
104. Id. at 447 (citing Standard Fruit & Veg. Co., 985 S.W.2d at 68).
105. See id. at 448 ("If the gravamen of a plaintiffs complaint is the type of wrong that the
statutory remedy was meant to cover, a plaintiff cannot maintain an intentional infliction claim
regardless of whether he or she succeeds on, or even makes, a statutory claim.").
106. See Retherford v. AT&T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 964-65
(Utah 1992).
107. See, e.g., id. at 964 66 (detailing the inquiry made by the court when applying the
indispensable element test).
108. Id.
109. Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that plaintiff s
interests sought to be protected by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort are fundamentally different); Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc.,
543 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ohio 1989) ("[T]he burden of proof for discrimination under statute is quite
different from any existing common-law tort and has its own elements and presumptions."); Schweitzer
v. Rockwell Int'l, 586 A.2d 383, 389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff s interests sought
to be protected by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and those sought to be protected by the
assault and outrage torts are fundamentally different).
110. Shaffer, 565 F. Supp. at 914.
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determining implied preemption should not involve a timing test or a same conduct
test. A timing test would draw lines between newer torts-intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent employment-and older torts-assault and
battery-that simply do not need to be drawn. It would be unfair to presume that
the legislature intended to preempt newer torts that exist separate and apart from
employment discrimination but not older torts that have a separate existence.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a valid tort that cuts across different
areas of the law. As such, it should not receive second class treatment. If the tort
exists, it should be applied evenly. A same conduct test has similar shortcomings.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is currently recognized almost
universally as an actionable tort.' 11 It may be historically correct to say that the tort
originated to fill perceived gaps in the law, but that is how all common law torts
developed."' It is not appropriate to single out intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims for implied preemption because they do not have as much history
behind them. If there is an underlying concern that the tort of outrage has become
too unwieldy," 3 the tort should be outlawed across the board. But if the tort is to
continue in existence, it should stand on equal footing with the older torts in the
context of implied preemption arguments.
The gap-filler argument also loses some luster if one views the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim as especially significant in terms of the tort
having an extremely high bar for recovery-to win such a case, the behavior
involved has to be the lowest of the low in terms of conduct that society will not
accept." 4 Lawyers know that safeguards have been put in place to make the tort of
outrage especially difficult to prove. "1 Thus, it is certainly a rarity when facts rise
111. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1956)
(explaining how the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort came to be recognized around 1930
as a cause of action in and of itself because there were too many cases involving intentional behavior
that caused emotional disturbance that could not be grounded upon the traditional common law torts
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land, nuisance, or invasion of the right to privacy).
113. Objections to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds of being
incapable of measurement, too dependent on the variation of individual victims, and opening the flood
gates to litigation based on trivialities, have existed prior to the recognition of the tort. Id. at 41-42
(citations omitted). Such objections undoubtedly persist to this day. See, e.g., Leslie Benton Sandor &
Carol Berry, Recovery of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 1247, 1253 60 (1995) (describing the policy issues implicated by the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
114. See Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) ("[T]he standard for
an outrage claim is admittedly very high (by which we mean that the conduct supporting the claim must
be appallingly low) .... ").
115. See Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 549 (5thCir. 1994) (explaining
that the plaintiff s emotional injuries, which included being upset, depressed, unnerved, and mortified,
were insufficient to meet the requisite standard for severe emotional distress since the plaintiff offered
no "medical testimony describing any clinical manifestations of depression or other medical
infirmities"), Archer v. Farmer Bros., 70 P.3d 495, 499 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he level of
outrageousness required to [prove intentional infliction of emotional distress] is extremely high.").
[Vol. 59:115
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to the level of meeting each of the elements of this tort." 6 It is a relatively settled
principle that proving a sexual harassment case under Title VII or a state
antidiscrimination statute does not translate into proving an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim. The outrage claim requires a higher level of proof,
more appalling conduct, and greater emotional suffering and injury than the
statutory claim." 7 Because the law has developed in this way, it is no longer fair to
say that the intentional infliction claim is just a gap-filler tort. The tort possesses a
deeper meaning nowadays: It sets an extremely high standard so that satisfaction
of that standard informs citizens that the conduct involved is of the type that the law
considers to be the most egregious and which violators will pay the most for.
The preferred approach for determining whether a state antidiscrimination
statute impliedly preempts the common law torts of assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent employment is four-fold. First, begin
with the longstanding rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be
strictly construed." 8 Second, recognize that the interests protected by the state
antidiscrimination statute are different from the interests protected by these
common law torts." 9 Third, understand that these common law torts were not
designed to address the problem of discrimination or some perceived gap in the
discrimination statute; they were designed as claims of general applicability in
which facts can arise to satisfy their elements. 20 Their existence separate and apart
from discrimination belies any intent to have them impliedly preempted. These first
three principles establish a strong, but rebuttable, presumption that the legislature
did not intend to preempt the application of these claims to fact patterns that also
give rise to a claim of statutory discrimination. This presumption is especially
appropriate given the fact that legislatures know how to expressly provide an
exclusive remedy by statute when desired.' 2' Finally, the rebuttable presumption
will only be overcome when there is clear and compelling evidence that the
116. For some rare cases, see Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 317, 319 (Mass.
1976) (overruling the dismissal of an employee's outrage claim against her employer where the
employer fired waitresses in alphabetical order until one of the waitresses admitted to a theft), and GTE
Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 617 (Tex. 1999) (finding that a manager's ongoing acts of
harassment, physical intimidation, and humiliation, along with daily obscene and vulgar behavior,
constituted extreme and outrageous conduct).
117. See Bigby v. Big 3 Supply Co., 937 P.2d 794, 800-01 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Metro. Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth. v. Mosley, 634 S.E.2d 466, 470 n.7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Fields v. Cummins
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds
by Wine-Settergren v. Lamey, 716 N.E.2d 381, 389 & n.8 (Ind. 1999).
118. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 109 10 and accompanying text.
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.
121. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990) (in bank) (finding that common law tort
claims were not preempted by California's antidiscrimination statute because the California legislature
did not include any express language manifesting an intent to abrogate common law remedies, as it had
in other California statutes); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 & n.66 (Okla. 1992)
(acknowledging the express exclusivity provisions in other Oklahoma statutes as a reason not to find
preemption of common law tort claims by the Oklahoma antidiscrimination statute which did not have
an exclusive remedy provision).
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structure of the antidiscrimination statute demonstrates a legislative intent to cover
the field.'22 It should be very rare that the presumption is overcome. Factors to
consider in this analysis include whether the statute applies to all employers in the
state regardless of size, whether the statute allows for the filing of a discrimination
claim in a court of law (as opposed to limiting a claim for discrimination to an
administrative adjudication), and the scope of the remedial structure.'23
B. Implied Preemption of "Dependent" Torts
The appropriate test to determine implied preemption of common law wrongful
discharge claims based on employment discrimination is the antecedent test. The
antecedent test works best because of the context in which these types of claims are
usually created and because these claims cover the same ground as a statutory
discrimination claim. There are several reasons why an antecedent test is preferable
for wrongful discharge claims and not appropriate for the independent torts of
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
employment.
The antecedent approach-common law claims are not preempted if
recognized before the enactment of the statute but are preempted if attempted to be
created after the enactment of the statute is a traditional approach to the
preemption question.'24 State antidiscrimination statutes were enacted in an era
when state common law almost universally did not recognize claims for
employment discrimination. 2 5 If a unique state did recognize a common law
remedy for any type of employment discrimination, the state's legislature, as it
drafted and enacted its antidiscrimination statute, should have taken the existence
of this unique common law remedy into consideration. Based on the established
principle that a statutory remedy that postdates a common law right is presumed
only cumulative, a legislature intending to preempt a preexisting common law
claim for employment discrimination needed to do so explicitly.'26 Absent explicit
preemption language, both the common law claim and statutory claim survive. 2
122. See, e.g., Frost v. Geernaert, 246 Cal. Rptr. 440, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (citing People v.
Zikorus, 197 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)) ("[T]here is a presumption a statute does not,
by implication, repeal the common law.").
123. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 90 92 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Pompey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243,250 51 (Mich. 1971) (stating that
prior to passage of its antidiscrimination statute in 1955, Michigan did not recognize a common law
remedy for discrimination in employment based on race); Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989, 995 (Utah
2002) ("[N]o common law remedy for employment discrimination existed prior to the enactment ofthe
[Utah Anti-Discrimination Act] in 1969.").
126. See Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68 (Colo. 1995) ("[T]he creation of a private
right of action by state statute does not bar pre-existing common law rights of action unless the
legislature clearly expressed its intent to do so.").
127. The illustration is somewhat hypothetical in that several searches on LexisNexis did not
reveal any jurisdictions that had formally recognized a common law remedy for discrimination prior
to the enactment of a state antidiscrimination statute. However, some of these jurisdictions likely do
exist. Even if ajurisdiction had not formally recognized such a common law remedy, a cobbled together
[Vol. 59:115
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It is an entirely different story when, as is almost always the case, the
jurisdiction had no existing common law remedy for employment discrimination
prior to the enactment of the state's antidiscrimination statute. In that scenario, the
state legislature is writing on a clean slate and deciding to create a new state remedy
to address a particular ill discrimination in employment. The legislature will
necessarily craft an action and a remedy based on policyjudgments. The legislature
will decide what constitutes discrimination in employment, as well as the various
categories-race, sex, age, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation that it wishes the law to protect. The decisions made with respect to
including or excluding protection for certain groups is entirely a legislative
prerogative, and some legislatures will extend protection to more groups than other
legislatures. '2 8 The legislature will also have to decide whether exemptions from the
law will be created based on the size of the employer. 12'9 The idea that "mom and
pop" outfits should not have to bear the burden of creating a personnel system
aimed at stopping discrimination and of defending costly discrimination suits is
codified in many state antidiscrimination statutes. 130 Whether one agrees with that
policy choice is immaterial; it is enough to recognize that a legislative exemption
for small employers is a policy choice. Finally, the legislature must make critical
policy choices concerning whether it will provide a judicial avenue for private
litigants to enforce the antidiscrimination statute and what remedies it will make
available for obtaining relief under the statute. 131
It is inevitable that the policy choices made by the state legislature will leave
some plaintiffs out in the cold in terms of being unable to bring a statutory
common law right from public policy, expressed in constitutions, other statutes, and case law, could be
found in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669, 676 (E.D. Cal. 1988) ("[P]rior
to enactment of FEHA, Califomia's public policy prohibited... employment discrimination based on
sex .... ").
128. Compare Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 23:301-:369
(1998 & Supp. 2007) (prohibiting employment discrimination because of age, disability, race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, pregnancy, childbirth, or sickle cell trait), with New Hampshire Law
Against Discrimination, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (prohibiting
employment discrimination because of age, sex, race, color, marital status, physical or mental disability,
religious creed, national origin, or sexual orientation).
129. See supra note 18 for a partial list of state antidiscrimination statutes with a small employer
exemption. Not all state antidiscrimination statutes have such an exemption. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-13-1(7) (2004) (containing no specific threshold for coverage under the statute).
130. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12 (summarizing variations in state antidiscrimination
remedial packages). There is wide variance among state antidiscrimination statutes concerning
administrative processes and when a lawsuit for discrimination under the applicable state statute may
be pursued. Many statutes require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suing in
court. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306(14) (2006). Some states have done away with the exhaustion
of administrative remedies requirement. For example, Nebraska has enacted a procedural statute that
allows plaintiffs to bring suit in state district court for violations of the Nebraska Fair Employment
Practice Act without first exhausting administrative remedies. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-148 (1997);
Goolsby v. Anderson, 549 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Neb. 1996) (per curiam). The rationale for this alternative
remedy is to aid plaintiffs who would otherwise be "trapped in bureaucratic backlogs such as the one
at [the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission]." Goolsby, 549 N.W.2d at 157 58.
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discrimination claim; other plaintiffs will be able to bring a claim but may not like
the forum available or the choice of remedies." 2 Yet, the antecedent test-a
traditional test-dictates that the policy choices reflected in the state
antidiscrimination statute be honored. The state antidiscrimination statute should
preempt post-enactment attempts to mimic the statutory action through a
duplicative common law discrimination action aimed at providing a remedy when
the legislature has impliedly rejected one.
The model decision that came to the correct result in a case in which the
aggrieved party tried to create a common law discrimination action after the
enactment of a state antidiscrimination statute is Gottling v. P.R. Inc.' The Utah
Supreme Court performed yeoman's work in avoiding the old adage that hard cases
make bad law. In Gottling, a former female employee sued her former employer for
allegedly terminating her employment because she refused to maintain a sexual
relationship with the owner. 4 The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA) provides
a remedy for aggrieved persons subjected to sexual harassment but only so long as
the offending employer employs fifteen or more employees. 13 5 Unfortunately, the
defendant employer in Gottling had less than fifteen employees; therefore, she
could not pursue an action under UADA. 6 Instead, she pursued an action for
wrongful termination in violation of an alleged public policy against sex
discrimination.'37 The court concluded, however, that "the structure and purpose of
... UADA clearly exhibit[ed] an implicit intent to preempt common law causes of
action for employment discrimination by both large and small employers.""'38
Accordingly, the court disallowed the action. 3 9
The Gottling court made two central points in its decision that bolster the
argument here. First, "no common law remedy for employment discrimination
existed in Utah prior to the enactment of... UADA in 1969.,,140 Thus .... UADA
could in no way be interpreted as taking away a preexisting common law right.
Instead, the Utah legislature, acting through... UADA, simply indicated its intent
to preempt the creation of a new right.' 4' Second, the balance of power on which
our system of government depends counseled against crafting a remedy where the
legislature intended no remedy to exist.'42 Whether or not it was a good idea to
exempt approximately 70% of the Utah workforce from the state antidiscrimination
statute through the small employer exemption was not the question. The court could
not in good faith displace a legislative judgment because to do so would threaten
132. See supra text accompanying notes 128 31.
133. 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002).
134. Id. at 990.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 991.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 994.
139. Id. at 997.
140. Id. at 995.
141. Id. at 997.
142. Id. at 998.
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government by the people through their elected representatives. 4 3 If the small
employer exemption is a bad idea, the petition for change should be made to the
Utah legislature.
144
The Utah approach to post-enactment attempts to create a common law action
to overcome statutory restrictions in a state antidiscrimination statute is not
followed by all states. 45 For example, Oregon takes the exact opposite approach,
presuming that the courts are free to create a duplicative common law wrongful
discharge action for sexual harassment after the enactment of the state
antidiscrimination statute because a legislature cannot intend to eliminate certain
remedies unless those remedies already exist.'46 In spite of the existence of
alternative approaches, the Utah approach still stands out as an example to be
followed. It makes the most sense in terms of historical development of
employment discrimination law and adherence to the will of the citizenry acting
through its chosen representatives.
IV. APPLICATION TO CURRENT LAWS OF SEVERAL STATES AND FUTURE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. Application of Principles to Various Jurisdictions
The preemption principles espoused in this Article may be used to analyze
whether a state's antidiscrimination statute impliedly preempts the state's common
law torts. The following Part analyzes three jurisdictions: New Mexico, Nevada,
and Nebraska. Each one of these states has a slightly different antidiscrimination
statute, but the end result regarding preemption should be the same: the independent
torts should not be preempted; the dependent tort of wrongful discharge should be
preempted.
1. New Mexico
New Mexico has a state antidiscrimination statute that prohibits discrimination
in employment called the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA). 47 NMHRA
was passed in 196914 and has been amended multiple times.'49 The statute makes
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Saint v. Data Exch., Inc., 145 P.3d 1037, 1037 (Okla. 2006); Collier v. Insignia Fin.
Group, 981 P.2d 321,326 (Okla. 1999); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225-26 (Okla.
1992); Weaver v. Harpster, 885 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Harmon v. Higgins, 426 S.E.2d
344, 346 (W. Va. 1992).
146. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or. 1984) (in banc).
147. New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004 &
Supp. 2006).
148. New Mexico Human Rights Act, 1969 N.M. Laws 704.
149. See, e.g., Labor Department Act, 1987 N.M. Laws 2515 (amending various provisions
throughout the Act); see also Gonzalez v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 11 P.3d 550, 553 (N.M. 2000)
(enumerating some of the amendments made to NMHRA in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2000).
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it illegal for an employer to discriminate in employment on the basis of race, sex,
age, etc. 150 An "employer" means "any person employing four or more persons and
any person acting for an employer."''15 The Act allows an aggrieved person to sue
in district court after exhausting administrative remedies with the New Mexico
Human Rights Commission of the Department of Labor. 152 The statute entitles a
prevailing plaintiff in an NMHRA case to actual damages and attorney's fees.'
The phrase "actual damages," as used in NMHRA, includes compensatory damages
but does not include punitive damages. 54 NMHRA does not contain any exclusive
remedy or preemption language. 155
New Mexico law recognizes common law actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, prima facie tort, assault, and battery. 56 The New Mexico
Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision does not bar an employee's
common law tort claims based on injuries resulting from sexual harassment in the
workplace. 57 Because the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar common law
claims arising from sexual harassment, the antidiscrimination preemption question
is especially important under New Mexico law.
Due to the absence of any express preemption language in NMHRA, the
rebuttable presumption is that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
prima facie tort, assault, and battery, based on facts that would also apply to
NMHRA, are not impliedly preempted by the statute. The specificities of the statute
do not overcome the presumption. Although the statute permits the filing of an
action in court after exhaustion of administrative remedies, 58 coverage does not
apply to all employers. 59 Moreover, the statutory remedies are limited because
punitive damages are disallowed. 6 '
The New Mexico Supreme Court has never directly spoken to the
antidiscrimination preemption question in the context of independent torts like
outrage, but the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled in a 1995 opinion that
NMHRA does not preclude plaintiffs from pursuing common law tort claims that
are also actionable under NMHRA.' 6' If the question ever comes before the New
Mexico Supreme Court, the decision of the state court of appeals should be
followed. In fact, relatively recent case law out of the New Mexico Supreme Court
suggests that NMHRA does not impliedly preempt intentional infliction of
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
151. Id. § 28-1-2(B) (LexisNexis 2004).
152. See id. § 28-1-13(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
153. Id. § 28-1-13(D).
154. See Behrmann v. Phototron Corp., 795 P.2d 1015, 1020 (N.M. 1990).
155. See §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006).
156. See Weinstein v. Santa Fe, 916 P.2d 1313, 1319 20 (N.M. 1996); Beavers v. Johnson
Controls World Servs., Inc., 901 P.2d 761, 769-70 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
157. See Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1005 (N.M. 1999).
158. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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emotional distress claims. In Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'62 the court upheld
a jury verdict on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that provided
compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs based their
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims upon allegations that their
supervisor sexually harassed them and their employer allowed the harassment to
continue with utter indifference to the consequences.' 6 4 The combined
compensatory damages for the plaintiffs' intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims were $45,000.165 The combined punitive damages for all of the tort claims
were $1,755,000.'66 The court upheld the full damages amount.'67
Another reason to believe that NMHRA does not preempt independent torts is
that the New Mexico Supreme Court has taken the further step of ruling that the
statute does not impliedly preempt the tort of retaliatory discharge. In Gandy v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' the plaintiff asserted a common law claim for retaliatory
discharge based on her contention that she was terminated from her employment
after she filed a discrimination charge against her employer with the New Mexico
Human Rights Division.'69 Her allegations of retaliation were actionable under the
retaliation provision in NMHRA,' 0 yet she phrased her claim as a common law
retaliatory discharge claim and not as a statutory retaliation claim.' 7' The Gandy
court held that the common law retaliatory discharge claim was not impliedly
preempted by NMHRA because the statutory administrative scheme and remedy
were not comprehensive.' 2
The Gandy court's reasoning would have been entirely appropriate had it been
addressing an independent tort like intentional infliction of emotional distress, but
the common law retaliatory discharge tort is really a dependent tort, like a common
law wrongful discharge claim based on employment discrimination. The retaliatory
discharge claim does not exist outside the parameters of employment discrimination
and retaliation law.'73 Under the antecedent test outlined in this Article, 7 4 the
Gandy court should have ruled that NMHRA impliedly preempted the claim if the
retaliatory discharge tort was not recognized under New Mexico law until after the
enactment of NMHRA. This appears to be the case. The New Mexico legislature
162. 976 P.2d 999 (N.M. 1999).
163. Id. at 1009.
164. Id. at 1002 03.
165. Id. at 1003.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1010-11.
168. 872 P.2d 859 (N.M. 1994).
169. Id. at 859.
170. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(1)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
171. Gandy, 872 P.2d at 859-60.
172. Id. at 861.
173. See, e.g., New Horizons Elecs. Mktg., Inc. v. Clarion Corp. ofAm., 561 N.E.2d 283,285 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has not expanded retaliatory discharge outside
the employment setting).
174. See supra notes 90 92 and accompanying text.
27
Gonzalez: State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Commo
Published by Scholar Commons, 2007
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
enacted NMHRA in 1969.' 7 New Mexico law did not recognize the retaliatory
discharge tort until 1983.176
2. Nevada
The Nevada antidiscrimination statute makes it unlawful to discriminate in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age,
disability, or national origin.'77 The statute only applies to employers with fifteen
or more employees.1"8 Complainants must exhaust administrative remedies under
the state statute before filing a case in state court. 79 It appears that the statutory
remedies available to a prevailing plaintiff under the Nevada antidiscrimination
statute include back pay, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive
damages.)0 Nevada law recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the employment termination context.181
The Nevada antidiscrimination statute, like the New Mexico statute, does not
have any express preemption language.' 82 Therefore, the rebuttable presumption is
that the Nevada statute does not preempt independent torts like intentional infliction
of emotional distress.'8 3 Whether the Nevada statutory scheme is sufficiently
comprehensive to overcome the presumption is a closer question under Nevada law
than it is under New Mexico law. Both New Mexico and Nevada require
administrative exhaustion before filing suit in a court of law.' 84 New Mexico covers
more employers than Nevada.'8 5 The primary factor weighing in favor of
preemption in Nevada is that the Nevada statutory remedy appears to provide a
fuller remedial system than New Mexico, including compensatory and punitive
damages. 8 6 If the Nevada statutory scheme applied to more employers, the
175. New Mexico Human Rights Act, 1969 N.M. Laws 704.
176. Gandy, 872 P.2d at 860 (citing Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983),
rev'don other grounds, 687 P.2d 1038, 1039 (N.M. 1984)).
177. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
178. Id. §613.310(2).
179. See Palmer v. State, 787 P.2d 803, 804 (Nev. 1990) (per curiam).
180. See Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771, 782 (D. Nev. 1992).
181. See L.S. Shoen v. Amerco, Inc., 896 P.2d 469, 476 (Nev. 1995) (per curiam) (citing MGM
Grand Hotel-Reno, Inc. v. Insley, 728 P.2d 821, 825-26 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam)).
182. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.310-.435 (LexisNexis 2006).
183. See discussion supra Part III.A.
184. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-13(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (allowing a complainant
to sue in district court after exhausting administrative remedies), with Palmer, 787 P.2d at 804 (stating
complainants must exhaust their administrative remedies under the state statute before filing a claim
in state court).
185. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (applying to employers with four
or more employees), with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §613.310(2) (applying to employers with fifteen or
more employees).
186. Compare Behrmanm v. Phototron Corp., 795 P.2d 1015, 1020 (N.M. 1990) (allowing a
plaintiffto recover compensatory damages but not punitive damages), with Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc.,
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preemption question would hang in the balance given the strong remedial system.
However, because of the significant small employer exemption, the presumption
against implied preemption for intentional infliction of emotional distress should
not be overcome.
187
The Nevada statute should preempt common law wrongful discharge actions
based on employment discrimination. Nevada did not recognize such claims at
common law prior to the enactment of the antidiscrimination statute. 188 Thus, the
Nevada courts should rebuff the understandable impulse to create such a post-
statutory enactment action for equitable reasons. In Chavez v. Sievers,' the Nevada
Supreme Court appropriately rejected an entreaty to recognize, for the first time, a
common law tortious action based on racial discrimination in employment against
Nevada employers not covered by the antidiscrimination statute. 90 The Chavez
court reasoned that, though racial discrimination is wrong and against Nevada
public policy, the policy choice made by the Nevada legislature-that small
businesses should not be subject to racial discrimination suits-must be honored.' 9'
3. Nebraska
Nebraska illustrates an even stronger case against implied preemption of
independent torts. The Nebraska profile is similar to the states already described.
The Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) 92 includes a fifteen
employee threshold for coverage'93 and a remedial package that includes general
and special damages.'94 It does not specifically provide for the recovery of punitive
damages. 9 ' Nebraska has also enacted a procedural statute that allows plaintiffs to
sue in state district court for NFEPA violations without first exhausting
administrative remedies.'96 The case against implied preemption of independent
torts is iron clad because NFEPA specifically states it does not "repeal ... any other
law of this state... relating to discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion,
187. The Nevada Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the Nevada
antidiscrimination statute preempts aplaintiff s intentional infliction ofemotional distress claim arising
out of discriminatory harassment. There is, however, a Nevada federal district court decision opining
that, if presented with the issue, the Nevada Supreme Court would hold Nevada's antidiscrimination
law does not preempt that type of common law tort claim. Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1267 68 (D. Nev. 2001) (citing to Arizona and California case law as the basis for its decision).
188. See supra note 127.
189. 43 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2002) (en banc).
190. Id. at 1024.
191. Id. at 1025 26.
192. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to -1126 (2004).
193. Id. § 48-1102(2).
194. Id. §48-1119(4). Special damages are generally interpreted to include nonpecuniary damages
like emotional distress and mental anguish. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and
the Seventh Amendment: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 25, 49 (2006).
195. See NEB. REV. STAT § 48-1119(4).
196. See id. § 20-148 (1997).
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sex, disability, or national origin."' 9 The Nebraska language prohibiting repeal of
other state laws relating to employment discrimination should not affect the
preemption question, as it relates to post-enactment common law wrongful
discharge claims based on employment discrimination, and refusing to create such
a duplicative action should not constitute repealing a state employment
discrimination law. Deference to the legislature concerning policy choices made as
to dependent torts should still prevail.
B. Lessons for Future Legislative Action
It may appear on the surface that the core of this Article's argument is
inexplicably inconsistent. The lack of a comprehensive statutory scheme and
remedy defeats implied preemption as to intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims; yet, the same cuts in favor of implied preemption of post-enactment
wrongful discharge claims.' 98 The argument is pragmatic, but it is not inconsistent.
The illusion of inconsistency exists because of the inherent difficulty in discerning
legislative intent from legislative silence. The approach advocated is simply an
attempt to infer the intended preemption result in dissimilar situations. For the
reasons described in this Article, it makes the most sense to treat independent torts
differently from dependent torts for purposes of implied preemption.'9 9 Legislative
silence is insufficient to preempt torts that exist outside the employment
discrimination arena, but it is sufficient to preempt common law wrongful discharge
claims that would simply replace policy choices made by the legislature.2"'
Of course, all of this line drawing would be unnecessary if legislatures took
more care in providing explicit direction in the statutes concerning preemption of
common law claims. It is somewhat befuddling, given the sophistication of the
preemption issues involved, that state antidiscrimination statutes often contain no
preemption language whatsoever.20 1 Legislatures do, in other areas, provide
guidance concerning the exclusiveness, or lack thereof, of a statutory remedy.20 2 For
whatever reason, that guidance is often lacking in this area and thus, out of
necessity, places the courts in the position of trying to connect the dots without a
ruler.
This Article establishes some common sense principles for courts to utilize in
ruling on the preemption of common law claims by state antidiscrimination statutes.
The principles are informed by a body of law that has developed in individual
jurisdictions over the last twenty-five years. The principles may be used by courts
that have not addressed these preemption questions or by courts that may wish to
reconsider previously decided opinions on these questions. State legislatures should
197. Id. § 48-1124 (2004).
198. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
199. See discussion supra Parts II, III.
200. See discussion supra Part 111.
201. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1-2.
202. See supra note 121.
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also take heed to the default rule established by this Article, as well as to other
approaches to the implied preemption question, because the varied approaches
demonstrate the unpredictability present in determining implied preemption
questions. The power to shape preemption law rests with the legislature, but silence
is abdication of that power and will lead the courts to do the best they can to
provide a just solution to differing factual scenarios.
State legislatures may choose not to amend their own antidiscrimination
statutes, especially if the courts in a particular jurisdiction are resolving the
unanswered preemption questions in a satisfactory manner. However, this issue will
not go away. The common law develops to address present and future problems in
the employment field. When a legislature acts on these problems, sometimes a step
behind the common law, the issue of whether the statute supplants the common law
or is merely cumulative is an important question." If our judicial system believes
in the continued vitality and importance of the law, which it should, the common
law should not be lightly eschewed unless there is a clear legislative direction to do
so.
V. CONCLUSION
Return at last to your most egregious racial or sexual harassment case. If your
jurisdiction has a state antidiscrimination statute and that statute is silent on the
preemption question, this Article posits that the aggrieved plaintiff should be able
to pursue an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. If such a claim is
established, the plaintiff should be able to seek recovery from amongst the gamut
of traditional common law remedies. The common law wrongful discharge claim
for discriminatory harassment, however, is impliedly preempted, even if the
aggrieved plaintiff has no remedy under the state statute due to lack of coverage.
203. See Nelson v. United Techs., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that the
California Family Rights Act does not preempt a wrongful discharge tort claim based upon violation
of the Act).
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